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“Piece” of mind: End of life in the intensive care unit
Statement of the Belgian Society of Intensive Care Medicine☆
End-of-life decisions are common in the intensive care unit (ICU)
with most deaths occurring in the ICU now preceded by a decision to
limit treatment [1-4]. However, it is important to deﬁne the degree of
“limitation of therapy.” Restricting discussion to nonintervention in
case of cardiac arrest—the “not to be resuscitated” or “do not
resuscitate” order—is not sufﬁcient. Other treatments must also be
included in the global term limitation of therapy, including, for
example, not applying mechanical ventilation in case of respiratory
failure, not giving renal replacement therapy in case of acute renal
failure, or not administering adrenergic support in case of acute
circulatory shock. In this context, the principle of proportionality of
care, as clearly deﬁned in a French law [5], is an important concept,
stating that therapies should only be administered in proportion to
expected beneﬁts. Hence, therapies that will act solely to artiﬁcially
prolong life should not be started or should be discontinued.
Belgium [6,7] has speciﬁc laws dealing with euthanasia in
terminally ill patients, but less than 1% of all deaths (approximately
1000 deaths/105000 total deaths per year in Belgium) occur as a
result of requested euthanasia. Discontinuing therapies at the end of
life in the ICU is performed in more than 10 times (N10000 deaths a
year) the number of individuals who die under the conditions of the
euthanasia law. Indeed, critically ill patients dying in the ICU are
usually not in a position to request euthanasia. As a result, in Belgium,
there is uncertainty about the legal consequences of starting a process
that will result in death in the ICU. Although forgoing futile treatment
is not against current Belgian legislation, difﬁculty can arise when the
purpose of the drugs used for comfort and pain relief in end-of-life
management is misconstrued as deliberate use to speed the dying
process [8]. This statement paper, developed by members of the
Belgian Society of Intensive Care Medicine Council, is not about giving
analgesics or sedative agents to combat pain or agitation, nor about
the so-called double effect, wherein analgesics given to alleviate pain
may have the adverse effect of shortening the dying process. The
discussion here is about the administration of sedative agents with
the direct intention of shortening the process of terminal palliative
care in patients with no prospect of a meaningful recovery.
Importantly, many of the issues discussed may seem obvious and
may even reﬂect current practice; nevertheless, in view of the
emotive, ethical and potential legal nature of these issues, we believe
that there is a need for them to be clearly stated. Moreover, we explain
our belief in the concept that shortening the dying process by
administering sedatives beyond what is needed for patient comfort
can be not only acceptable but in many cases desirable.
Three generally well-accepted principles:
1. Suffering should be avoided at all times. When the intensive care
team reaches a consensus that current treatment no longer has any
meaningful perspective and/or is disproportionate and/or is in
conﬂict with advance directives, then it is ethically justiﬁed—and
even appropriate—to stop this treatment. Indeed, such treatment
would no longer bring beneﬁt (principle of beneﬁcence) and may
even cause harm (principle of nonmaleﬁcence) to the individual.
2. With the availability of modern organ support, most deaths in
the ICU are preceded by a withhold/withdraw decision, often
associated with increased doses of sedative/opioids agents with
the intention to provide humane end-of-life care. It is ethically
desirable to stop nonbeneﬁcial treatment and to avoid continu-
ing futile treatment. The Belgian Society of Intensive Care
Medicine stated previously: “It is not only acceptable but
necessary to stop active treatment in some patients who are
arriving, irreversibly, at the end of their life” [9].
3. Relatives should be informed of prognosis and end-of-life
decisions at all times.
Ten general complementary principles that we believe should be
adopted:
1. As we have previously stated [9], although withdrawing a
treatment sometimes seems more difﬁcult than withholding, we
believe there isnoethical ormoral differencebetween the two; for
example, the end result of discontinuingmechanical ventilation is
the same as if it had not been started in the ﬁrst place.
2. There is no clear ethical distinction between withholding/
withdrawing supportive therapy and increasing doses of seda-
tive/opioid substances in patients in whom further treatment is
no longer considered beneﬁcial. Again, we previously stated:
“Pragmatically, it is difﬁcult to establish a coherent distinction
between increasing analgo-sedation even substantially while
maintaining life support, and discontinuing life support” [9].
3. Decisions to limit therapy must include all team members, not
just the physicians. Every effort should also be made to involve
all the physicians (including but not exclusively ICU physi-
cians) who have cared for the patient. A consensus should be
obtained for every end-of-life decision, although the decision
remains the responsibility of the ICU physician. Once this
consensus decision is made, all members of the team must
apply the plan that has been decided on.
4. The plans for end-of-life care in each individual patient should
be discussed with and understood by the relatives (or the
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patient's surrogate if one has been appointed). However, it
must be made clear that the ﬁnal decision is made by the care
team and not by the relatives.
5. All end-of-life care planning should be clearly documented in
the medical chart.
6. Shortening the dying process with use of medication, such as
analgesics/sedatives, may sometimes be appropriate, even in
the absence of discomfort, and can actually improve the quality
of dying; this approach can also help relatives accompany their
loved one through the dying process—such a decision should be
madewithdue consideration for thewishes of familymembers.
7. Treatmentsmaybe stopped, but patient care is neverdiscontinued.
8. Maintaining an individual's dignitymust always remainapriority.
9. Through the entire process, the intention must not be
interpreted as killing but as a humane act to accompany the
patient at the end of his/her life.
10. The present document applies to children as well as to adults
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